TL;DRussia Special Edition

22 April 2025: When is a deal not a deal?

Vladimir Putin’s ceasefire offer represents a calculated attempt to secure at the negotiating table what he cannot win on the battlefield: the neutering of Ukraine as a sovereign entity. It’s critical to understand that this gambit is not about territorial control — it never was.

According to reporting from the Financial Times, Putin is now "offering" to halt the war at the current line of control, minus the portion of Kursk Oblast still held by Ukraine. The conditions for this supposed ceasefire include recognition of Crimea and other Russian-occupied territories, as well as a firm rejection of NATO membership for Ukraine.

Notably absent from the reporting are any details regarding security guarantees (such as the deployment of a European force), sanctions relief, or Western positions on the status of the occupied territories. The absence of information on these fronts is troubling — in this case, no news is bad news.

The natural first question is whether Putin is serious. I believe he probably is. He knows he cannot — at least for now — gain full military control over the territories Russia claims or over Ukraine as a whole. But achieving full control was never the true objective. This has always been a war for dominion, and dominion can be exercised through means other than direct occupation. Putin’s offer could create a framework of permanent insecurity for Kyiv, and political control over Ukraine, provided two conditions are met: first, that no European force deploys to deter further aggression; and second, that without deterrence, Ukraine’s path to the European Union is effectively blocked.

Putin is playing into Donald Trump’s timetable precisely because he knows Europe cannot match Trump's urgency. Europe is serious about guaranteeing Ukrainian security, but it is not yet ready to act. Putin understands this, and he is using the time pressure created by the U.S. political calendar to force through a settlement that Europe otherwise would not accept.

He will also attempt to portray Ukraine and Europe as bad-faith actors if they hesitate to accept his terms. European leaders may tell themselves they can install a security force later, after a ceasefire is in place — but that is almost certainly a mistake. Once the shooting stops, the political conversation in Europe will inevitably shift — aided by Moscow and its allies — toward ensuring that war does not resume. At that point, any move to place a European assurance force on Ukrainian soil would be framed as a provocation that risks reigniting conflict.

Thus, a European force must be deployed either before or at the exact moment of a ceasefire’s inception. If the ceasefire comes first, the opportunity to install meaningful deterrence will almost certainly vanish. For Europe, the choice is now or never.

And Europe does have leverage — if it chooses to use it. European governments can, for example, quickly announce a no-fly zone over much, if not all, of Ukraine, policed initially from outside Ukrainian airspace, daring Russia to challenge it. They can also move decisively to seize Russian sovereign assets, the bulk of which are held in European accounts.

The European Commission can and should accelerate the EU enlargement process for Ukraine, even if NATO membership remains blocked — again, daring Moscow to respond. Brussels can also deprioritize alignment with U.S. foreign policy priorities if Washington continues to ignore European concerns.

Moreover, Europe can permanently end the Nord Stream pipelines, complete energy interconnectors to protect Ukraine and Moldova, and close the loopholes currently exploited by Hungary, Slovakia, and others. Europe holds considerable power — the question is whether it will choose to exercise it.

If the deal outlined in the Financial Times reporting is indeed the offer on the table, Europe’s response must focus on the three missing elements: security guarantees, the future of sanctions, and the question of territorial recognition.

First, Europe can refuse to sign on to, or abide by, any deal that leaves Ukraine insecure, working directly with Kyiv to build meaningful defense structures despite opposition from Moscow and even Washington.

Second, Europe can hold the line on key sanctions, particularly regarding frozen assets, financial flows (such as continued exclusion of Russia from SWIFT), and energy imports, while extending compliance requirements to U.S. corporations that continue business with Russia.

Finally, Europe can impose costs on Washington if it moves to recognize Russia’s territorial claims over Ukrainian land, including sanctions on American corporations and individuals who profit from stolen property.

Others have made similar arguments. Eric Ciaramella and Eric Green have outlined how Europe can move independently on Ukrainian security. Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Kosenko have detailed the powerful leverage Europe holds over Russia’s frozen sovereign assets. The Polish foreign minister has spoken forcefully about defending Ukraine against Russian missile attacks. And the EU’s own sanctions envoy has reiterated Europe's commitment to maintaining pressure on Moscow.

In short, while Washington and Moscow may succeed in imposing a ceasefire on Ukraine on unfavorable terms, Europe still has the power to alter the outcome — if it chooses to act.