While We Wait: Election-time Q&A

5 November 2024: TL;DRussia 'Ask Me Anything' Roundup

As we wait for the US election results to roll in, I wanted to engage in a bit of group therapy with readers, through an ‘Ask Me Anything’ session on Substack Chat. Initial questions and answers are below. Please feel free to post more!

Marek Treiman: I have a strong issue with your latest argument that Trump might not be as bad for Ukraine as many fear. … His motive is his ego. He wants to be seen as a deal maker and a respected strong leader – no matter the contents of the deal. He would gladly give Putin total control of Ukraine and claim he stopped bloodshed and avoided nuclear war. That would be his gain.

Yeah, I hear you. To be clear, I don’t see a pathway to a sustainable resolution of the war—meaning, a resolution that provides for Ukraine’s sovereignty and security—under a Trump presidency. My point was simply that I’m not convinced that he will necessarily simply hand Ukraine over to Putin, although I accept that he might.

At the end of the day, however, Ukraine is unlikely to be the most important thing on Trump’s agenda, and—if he’s elected—he will quickly find himself embroiled in the push and pull of politics in Washington. An abject American capitulation to Russia’s ambitions in Ukraine would, of course, be disastrous to American national security and its broader interests. Whether Trump actually cares about that is a different story. But it is also unlikely to win him any political capital in DC, and in fact it is likely to cost him quite a bit, and that’s something he does care about, or at least something he has cared about in the past. Keeping Ukraine afloat under a Trump administration, however, will depend in large measure on the balance of power in Congress. If the Freedom Caucus are able to strengthen their grip on the Republican leadership in the House and replace McConnell with a less hawkish Minority/Majority Leader in the Senate, Trump may end up with a much freer hand.

M: Are there things beyond our control and understanding? Are we seeing a move towards the Network State?

Are there things beyond our control and understanding? Absolutely—though I don’t think there’s anything that’s fundamentally beyond our ability to analyze to one degree or another. I’ve been open about my doubts about how well we understand a lot of elements of this picture, ranging from the cost-benefit analysis in the Kremlin to public opinion in countries around the world, and myriad things in between.

I’m not sure that’s what you mean, though. The question I think you’re asking is whether we’re entering an era of fundamental democratic breakdown, in which ordinary citizens suffer a catastrophic loss of power at the hands of elites and corporations that effective capture and subvert the institutions of the state. The answer, I think, is maybe.

I’m not entirely certain which conceptualization of the ‘network state’ you’re referring to. There is the crypto-bro vision of Balaji Srinivasan, in which the network state emerges as a kind of trans-national, hyper-libertarian world of supposedly benevolent corporations and uber-mobile entrepreneurs. Whether you see this as utopia or dystopia is up to the beholder, I suppose, but the whole thing strikes me as little more than a fantasy. I suspect, though, that you have in mind something closer to the idea developed by people like Manuel Castells, building on the earlier work of Nicos Poulantzas, involving the decline of the traditional nation-state, which struggles to govern transnational corporate and digital spaces. In this view, the network state contains both threats and opportunities; indeed, Castells is optimistic that networked civil society may be able to reassert the democratic franchise.

What are we actually facing? That’s a bigger question than I can deal with here, but I can understand—looking at the role of people like Elon Musk or Peter Thiel in contemporary politics—why we might be asking the question. The populists and authoritarians who are doing most damage to democracy, however, are reasserting the primacy of the nation-state, however, so I don’t think it’s a clear-cut thing.

RJP: How much of a blow will it be perceived to be in Moscow if Harris wins? How invested in a Trump victory are they, and how much do you think they have altered their war plans accordingly?

The answer to this depends, I think, on what you mean by Moscow. The media machine is wholly invested in Trump and will suffer a bit of a fit if Harris wins. But the media machine, while operating hand in glove with the Kremlin, is not the Kremlin itself. The government likely takes a more nuanced view. Certainly, as I wrote this weekend, the Kremlin would prefer a Trump presidency, mostly because it undermines transatlantic solidarity and creates more opportunity and room for maneuver, in Ukraine and beyond.

That said, the Kremlin will remember that Trump was not exactly a reliable partner during while in the White House, and there is little to suggest that he’d be more malleable in a second term. Moreover, a Trump foreign policy is likely to be more erratic and unpredictable than a Harris foreign policy, which brings its own challenges for Moscow. As a result, there are important respects in which Moscow might not mind a Harris win, even if it means continued support for Ukraine. Indeed, as I’ve argued before, I think the Kremlin is so committed to long-term geopolitical confrontation with the US that it might be perfectly happy to have a clear-cut adversary in the White House.

Bogdan: In a Silicon Curtain podcast, Ryan McBeth said we are already in World War 3 as of 2014. He also said the Chinese help will be less hidden as time goes and when needed. Do you share his views? Are there political/military/economic plans and scenarios for such developments?

This is another big question, and I’m not sure it’s one that has a satisfactory answer. US and other Western policymakers will tell you that they have a plan to deal with Chinese support and are implementing it, involving a combination of diplomatic pressure and secondary sanctions. In fairness, this is having some effect, although far from enough. Western governments, however, are nervous about pushing too hard on secondary sanctions, which might provoke China to go all-in on Russia’s efforts not just to win the war, but to break the global trading and financial systems that extend Western power.

Are there plans in place for a more overt Chinese intervention? I mean, there are plans in the Pentagon and the State Department for everything, so I presume the answer is yes. But are these plans that anyone is seriously prepared to implement? I doubt it—not least because I don’t think anyone in the US government or in most European governments believes that Beijing is ready to escalate to that extent in Europe. (Contingency plans for Taiwan are another story entirely.) And I’m inclined to agree: I’ve seen very little indication that China is willing to take that kind of risk on behalf of Russia.

Viatcheslav Sosnov: I actually read Project 2025 vis-à-vis Ukraine and if Trump abides by it we wouldn’t be in such a dark place as we are right now. The question is, will he and if he will, to what degree?

Interesting question. I’m not entirely sure what you’ve been reading. The main Project 2025 book is a department-by-department inventory of the US government and doesn’t say anything about Ukraine. I haven’t seen anything specifically about Ukraine in other Project 2025 documents, but maybe I’ve missed it. There is, of course, part of the Republican establishment that has been arguing for a much more forward position than the Biden Administration has taken, providing more weapons more quickly and with fewer restrictions. But that position is at odds with the one taken by the Freedom Caucus, which is the core of Trump’s support in the party, so even if it has come out under the Project 2025 label, I wouldn’t assume that it reflects Trump’s own thinking.

Viatcheslav Sosnov: Any thoughts on the Finlandization of Ukraine?

I would like to think that this proposal is dead by now, but it keeps rearing its head. I wrote about why I think the Finlandization proposal makes no sense way back in February 2022, a couple of weeks before the full-scale invasion. I mean, you only need to ask the Finns how forced neutrality worked for them, and why they rushed to join the EU—which neutrality precluded—at the first opportunity. For the Kremlin, Ukrainian neutrality is a means to an end, the end being political subjugation. As a result, I wouldn’t expect Moscow to sign up to any configuration of Ukrainian neutrality that would allow it to integrate into the EU and bolster its political and economic sovereignty. And if that’s the case, how can anyone in the West see this as a viable solution?

Kalle Kniivilä: How do you think the remainder of Biden’s term will be in regard to Ukraine, if Trump wins? If Harris wins?

Great question. I don’t have a crystal ball, but I’ll venture a couple of predictions. First, regardless of who wins, I would expect at least some of the shackles to come off with regard to permission for the use of long-range weapons. Aside from his general anxiety about escalation, Biden has evidently wanted to avoid doing anything that might provoke an ‘October Surprise’ and thus upset Harris’s route to election. As a result, some things that had been held up may begin to move more rapidly.

If Harris wins, I don’t imagine we’ll see much change in Biden’s policy or tactics, although he may begin to make some changes in anticipation of any plans Harris may have. The bigger change would come if Trump wins, in which case I’d expect Biden to try to work quickly to move as much money out to Ukraine as quickly as possible, and to lock in long-term appropriations and commit his successor to at least some degree of ongoing support (though that will be trickier, given presidential discretion). That will all be predicated on how the Congressional elections turn out, however.

Laura: What is the likelihood that the West will respond in some way to Russia’s recruitment of North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine? Is the red line some have mentioned going to be held up as they say, or is it bluster?

András Rácz: What kind of Western reaction do you expect to the combat deployment of North Korean forces?

I wish I knew! There isn’t much room for new sanctions to be imposed on Pyongyang, and the US is certainly not going to strike North Korea militarily. Beyond that, I’m not sure what the options will be. Inevitably, Washington and NATO will be watching the North Korean troops closely to learn how and how well they fight, as will anyone else out there who might be considering coming in on Russia’s side. I imagine, though, that some readers will have a clearer view of this issue than I do – including András! Please chime in!

Keep the questions coming!