TL;DRussia Special Edition

A good day for Ukrainian diplomacy – and three imperatives for Europe

NB: If you follow me on X or Bluesky, you may already have seen the thoughts below. I’m presenting them again here for those who prefer a quieter reading environment.

After weeks of compounding disaster, today was a good day for Ukrainian diplomacy: Kyiv won the restoration of US arms and intel support and shifted the balance of political pressure to Russia, all at the cost of a notional commitment to a bilateral ceasefire, with no territorial concessions and, as yet, no minerals deal.

Things get harder from here, though.

The first challenge Ukraine is likely to face is renewed American inconsistency. As you read this, Steve Witkoff is either already in or en route to Moscow, and Trump has promised a quick result. He is likely to be disappointed. The Kremlin has given no indication that it is interested in a ceasefire, and indeed plenty of indication that it is not. While all that may be bluster, they are likely to try to make Washington squirm, both on the speed and the contours of a deal.

Given Trump's sense that he has greater leverage over Kyiv than over Moscow, Russian uncooperativeness is likely to translate into more American frustration with ... Ukraine (of course). Kyiv should thus assume that all of the nice things Trump has just restored may easily be re-withdrawn. Indeed, European policymakers are quietly fretting that Trump’s desire to maintain leverage over Kyiv is one of the reasons why Washington walked back the suspension of support so quickly.

The first imperative for Kyiv’s European friends, then, is to reduce Ukraine's dependence on American support, particularly in the areas of intelligence and air defense. Hardening Ukraine against Russian attack now, alas, also requires hardening it against American gamesmanship.

All of that said, while the smart money is clearly on Russia declining the offer of a ceasefire, I wouldn't be so quick to rule it out entirely. Depending on how Moscow sees the trajectory of European policy, it may come to the conclusion that a ceasefire is in its interests.

Moscow's overriding objective is dominion over Ukraine. In the absence of an opportunity to acheive that on the battlefield, Russia may be happy—temporarily or otherwise—to exercise control through the threat of renewed aggression. A ceasefire may allow Russia the degree of control over Ukraine it seeks, provided the terms do not create genuine deterrence against renewed aggression. At the moment, the greatest potential for creating that deterrence is the plan for a European "reassurance force".

If Moscow thinks Europe is serious about boots on the ground, it might move for a ceasefire before Europe can get organized—and then make the absence of troops the condition for maintaining the ceasefire. And Washington, unwilling to risk Trump's deal with Putin, may not care to object too strenuously.

The second imperative for Europe, then, is to move quickly to create facts on the ground, positioning a reassurance force to go in as soon as the fighting pauses, and before either the Russians or the Americans can get in the way.

Lastly, whatever happens next, Washington will most likely remain committed to the normalization of relations with Russia. If a ceasefire emerges or even begins to look plausible, we should thus expect the question of the frozen sovereign assets to be put on the table. The fact that more than 80% of the frozen assets are in Europe hasn't prevented DC from pontificating about them, nor will it stop Trump from trying to give them back if he thinks that's the route to normalization.

Without the frozen assets, however, Europe cannot rebuild and defend Ukraine. And without those assets, there is no justice for the victims of Russian aggression. The third imperative for Europe, then, is to take them off the table. In practice, that likely means not spending them outright—while large, they are a fraction of the $1 trillion cost of reconstruction—but rather putting them in custody so that they can be managed and leveraged. Either way, Europe will want to make it clear both to Moscow and to Washington that the sovereign assets are and will remain beyond Russia's reach, and that Ukraine's future socio-economic viability is not a bargaining chip.

However things pan out—and I'm not making any predictions here!—the question now is whether European leaders allow themselves to believe that the the Kyiv-Washington dynamic is back on a sustainable track, or whether they remain in their conviction that Europe must lead. As they consider what action is required, European leaders would do well to remember what they're up against: two presidents who thrive on being unpredictable, and who demobilize opponents by monopolizing their attention span.

An effective European response, then, requires setting aside conversations about what Trump or Putin will do next, and focusing on what Europe itself needs to do to provide security and stability for Ukraine and the continent.