This is an excellent, insightful essay, which to my mind paints a better picture of Russian society's complex relationship to the Russian state, than anything I've read lately. I find the concept of "aggressive immobility" to be pretty persuasive, although I would say also that even if this is entirely true (and I think it may be), it does not contradict the idea that elements of the other theories may also be true.
Just one quibble: "The Kremlin’s abortive attempt to mobilize men into service in the autumn of 2022, and its consistent unwillingness to repeat the experiment, would seem to reinforce the notion that Russians value their autonomy as the key resource with which to solve the problems the state throws at them."
Where do you get the idea that the activation of reserves (to be technically precise about what the Russian military did in the autumn of 2022) was "abortive"? After a shambolic start, it did achieve its objective of increasing available force by 300,000. I don't think you call anything "abortive", which achieved its stated goal.
Why was it not repeated? Because new brigades require salaries, equipment, munitions, and supplies, and take that many people out of a work force already serious challenged by labor shortages, and the achieved force level, reinforced by a healthy flow of volunteers, appears to have been deemed enough. Once it became apparent that the initial plan to seize the country in a couple of weeks was a failure, the Russians pivoted to a long war scenario with economic and military planning going hand in hand, in a very Soviet way, a la WWII. For that, they needed to get the balance right between military expenditure and the resilience of the economy. That's not just a question of civilian morale (although that's also a factor), it's a question of designing and planning the entire chain of the generation of force all the way back to the basic economics of the country -- in a very Soviet, central-planning manner.
RUSI wrote about the Russians' "AK-47 economy" last summer -- crude, inefficient, but hella robust. Good for winning wars -- like Stalin's economy was after the five year plans of crash industrialization. I'm afraid though that Russia will fall further and further behind economically after the war is over and the dust settles -- as Stalin's USSR did after WWII.
I don't think you're right about the reasons why mobilization has not been repeated. Russia has continued to recruit new soldiers who also need equipment, munitions, and supplies, but they have done so at much higher salaries because they have opted to recruit volunteers in exchange for huge bonuses.
I'm not sure where you're disagreeing with me. Indeed, what you say is what they did. Michael Kofman yesterday in a Foreign Affairs podcast (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/putins-fight-wont-end-ukraine) said that the reason for this was that it was more efficient than requiring mobilized reservists to leave their jobs. Because Russia has severe labor shortages, and they pay as much attention to war production and functioning of the economy, as they do to the military situation.
So why are the Russians taking in volunteers with huge signing bonuses, rather than activating reservists? The answer is because they can. They have plenty of money (tax revenues are way up), plenty of people, but not plenty of labor, so they try to compete for labor in a way which causes the least harm to war production and to the economy in general.
Attrition warfare is a marathon, a contest of resilience and sustainability. The Russians, for all of their other military screwups, are following their WWII playbook here, regarding warfare as a whole continuous chain starting with war production.
Why do you think Russian economy will fall behind economically? First and foremost, the technical genie is out of the bottle and no matter what the west (US) does, it cannot be put back again.
Secondly, while the military industry in Russia is in the hands of the government (and one could say succesfully so, since the west has admitted that they are outproduced by a factor of 3), all the other aspects of industry, etc are in private hands and not driven by a sclerotic managerial class, the Russians and the Chinese have learned this lesson, while the west has becaome financialized and idiologized.
The new materials and other innovations from the military sector will bleed out to the civil sector, something that is highly encouraged by the leadership in Russia.
The Russian economy is plagued by a number of problems, and probably the greatest of those are pervasive corruption and cronyism, lack of security of property rights, etc., but the curse of natural resources wealth is another factor. I don't personally think that the war is going to do anything to reduce these problems, but we'll see.
The connection with China is a plus for Russia, in my view. The Chinese economy is a juggernaut which will soon eclipse the U.S. economy, and partnership with China comes with a lot less strings attached.
"The Russian economy is plagued by a number of problems, and probably the greatest of those are pervasive corruption and cronyism" is this hearsay or just something the west keeps repeating as in trying to make it true. Then how Russia produces 3 times more than the entire west in terms of military materiel for 100th or 500th the cost. I am not sure who's economy is more plagued by corruption.
Property rights my a$$! Open AI ChatGPT was trained with stolen information.
The Chinese real economy has long surpassed US real economy.
I have first hand knowledge of this, so know it to be true.
That does not mean that the Russian economy is on the verge of collapse or is hopelessly outdated -- no. Russia still has large industrial capacity and using command or semi-command methods is way outproducing the West in war materiel. But that's also a difference of commitment -- Russia is on a war footing, and the West, having never intended to win this war, is not.
Problems with property rights I also have direct knowledge. The laws are fine, but there is a lack of law and order. It's easy to lose your property -- I'm talking about your business interests. This is a huge impediment to investment, both foreign and domestic.
Agree with you about China, which is a juggernaut. The Chinese economy has its own problems, but so does the U.S.
Social contract, passive adaptation, and aggressive immobility. I had not put as much thought to these, but I can understand the arguments for them.
It’s going to be fascinating to watch what happens ver the next few years. Russia has such a different culture than my own, that I simply cannot guess what will happen. Thank you for writing things in a way that is so informative! I wish more people read what you say.
Not much has resonated with me from this essay, despite the author's effort to theorize the situation. Very hard thing to do when you talk about a country of almost 150 million, stretching 11 time zones, and with soo many ethnicities - to remember that Russians are the great majority, over 75% and in majority in most of those republics (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republics_of_Russia#Republics).
All these theories try ultimately tp box all this diversity. One little thing seemed right, the notion that Russians prize their individualism and choices, whatever they might be. That also has an universalist tint to it.
Also, the author misses the point that all states are authoritarian, in the sense that the executive has the authority to do things. Is Russia more authoritarian than, let's say Germany or UK nowadays? It really doesn't look like that to an outside observer.
So the question is, why don't these other peoples not revolt? One would need to apply the same methodology and check for ansers. However, the biggest missing ingredient is not discussed at all. The fact that the majority revolts when there is shortage of food (See the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution; the English Revolution and the American Revolution were from the start full fledged and confined burgoise revolutions, going against "feudal" taxes). Otherwise they stay away from trouble. Was the Maidan action representative for the whole Ukraine?! Heck no! If it were, it wouldn't have ended with a protracted civil war and a foreign intervention. In fact it was a protest that served as a cover for a coup d'etat...
Also, there is so far scant evidence of North Korean troops doing anything in Kursk area, like in ppm level, why even mention it. ANd after the USAID was gutted, is Meduza still functioning?
Generally all revolutions are conflicts between rivaling groups of elites. Also the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution 1917. The latter, like the US civil War, a conflict between the old agricultural elites and the up and coming captains of the industry.
There some fodder for your Ukraine thesis (dated November 2013 / Google translates it well):
Nah, there were lots of factions each pulling in certain direction. In France, the burgeoise won against a more redistributive approach. In Russia the Bolsheviks won after they fooled everyone (urban soviets, military soviets, peasantry looking for land redistribution)...
Even in England there were levelers and diggers...
In the Iran revolution there were factions, including communists. In Ukraine it was the right wing that did the shooting and killing on Maidan and cerried with the coup and threatened Rada if they don't accept the overturn of the government and paper it over.
Fascinating. I like it when you indulge in this kind of discussion.
It's interesting to hear your account of the three different schools. I must say, I always thought of the social contract as working in a slightly different way, where instead of providing stability and prosperity, the government's commitment was basically to stay out of people's personal lives. People gave up their political freedom to Putin, but in exchange, they maintained their personal freedom.
To some extent, that would bridge the gap between the authoritarian social contract and the aggressive immobility, in that the breach of the contract would be an infringement on people's ability to get by without interference from the government.
In that case, I think the most likely trigger for protests in Russia would be a general mobilization for the war because that is pretty much the ultimate infringement on people's personal freedom.
This is an excellent, insightful essay, which to my mind paints a better picture of Russian society's complex relationship to the Russian state, than anything I've read lately. I find the concept of "aggressive immobility" to be pretty persuasive, although I would say also that even if this is entirely true (and I think it may be), it does not contradict the idea that elements of the other theories may also be true.
Just one quibble: "The Kremlin’s abortive attempt to mobilize men into service in the autumn of 2022, and its consistent unwillingness to repeat the experiment, would seem to reinforce the notion that Russians value their autonomy as the key resource with which to solve the problems the state throws at them."
Where do you get the idea that the activation of reserves (to be technically precise about what the Russian military did in the autumn of 2022) was "abortive"? After a shambolic start, it did achieve its objective of increasing available force by 300,000. I don't think you call anything "abortive", which achieved its stated goal.
Why was it not repeated? Because new brigades require salaries, equipment, munitions, and supplies, and take that many people out of a work force already serious challenged by labor shortages, and the achieved force level, reinforced by a healthy flow of volunteers, appears to have been deemed enough. Once it became apparent that the initial plan to seize the country in a couple of weeks was a failure, the Russians pivoted to a long war scenario with economic and military planning going hand in hand, in a very Soviet way, a la WWII. For that, they needed to get the balance right between military expenditure and the resilience of the economy. That's not just a question of civilian morale (although that's also a factor), it's a question of designing and planning the entire chain of the generation of force all the way back to the basic economics of the country -- in a very Soviet, central-planning manner.
RUSI wrote about the Russians' "AK-47 economy" last summer -- crude, inefficient, but hella robust. Good for winning wars -- like Stalin's economy was after the five year plans of crash industrialization. I'm afraid though that Russia will fall further and further behind economically after the war is over and the dust settles -- as Stalin's USSR did after WWII.
I don't think you're right about the reasons why mobilization has not been repeated. Russia has continued to recruit new soldiers who also need equipment, munitions, and supplies, but they have done so at much higher salaries because they have opted to recruit volunteers in exchange for huge bonuses.
I'm not sure where you're disagreeing with me. Indeed, what you say is what they did. Michael Kofman yesterday in a Foreign Affairs podcast (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/putins-fight-wont-end-ukraine) said that the reason for this was that it was more efficient than requiring mobilized reservists to leave their jobs. Because Russia has severe labor shortages, and they pay as much attention to war production and functioning of the economy, as they do to the military situation.
So why are the Russians taking in volunteers with huge signing bonuses, rather than activating reservists? The answer is because they can. They have plenty of money (tax revenues are way up), plenty of people, but not plenty of labor, so they try to compete for labor in a way which causes the least harm to war production and to the economy in general.
Attrition warfare is a marathon, a contest of resilience and sustainability. The Russians, for all of their other military screwups, are following their WWII playbook here, regarding warfare as a whole continuous chain starting with war production.
Why do you think Russian economy will fall behind economically? First and foremost, the technical genie is out of the bottle and no matter what the west (US) does, it cannot be put back again.
Secondly, while the military industry in Russia is in the hands of the government (and one could say succesfully so, since the west has admitted that they are outproduced by a factor of 3), all the other aspects of industry, etc are in private hands and not driven by a sclerotic managerial class, the Russians and the Chinese have learned this lesson, while the west has becaome financialized and idiologized.
The new materials and other innovations from the military sector will bleed out to the civil sector, something that is highly encouraged by the leadership in Russia.
The Russian economy is plagued by a number of problems, and probably the greatest of those are pervasive corruption and cronyism, lack of security of property rights, etc., but the curse of natural resources wealth is another factor. I don't personally think that the war is going to do anything to reduce these problems, but we'll see.
The connection with China is a plus for Russia, in my view. The Chinese economy is a juggernaut which will soon eclipse the U.S. economy, and partnership with China comes with a lot less strings attached.
"The Russian economy is plagued by a number of problems, and probably the greatest of those are pervasive corruption and cronyism" is this hearsay or just something the west keeps repeating as in trying to make it true. Then how Russia produces 3 times more than the entire west in terms of military materiel for 100th or 500th the cost. I am not sure who's economy is more plagued by corruption.
Property rights my a$$! Open AI ChatGPT was trained with stolen information.
The Chinese real economy has long surpassed US real economy.
I have first hand knowledge of this, so know it to be true.
That does not mean that the Russian economy is on the verge of collapse or is hopelessly outdated -- no. Russia still has large industrial capacity and using command or semi-command methods is way outproducing the West in war materiel. But that's also a difference of commitment -- Russia is on a war footing, and the West, having never intended to win this war, is not.
Problems with property rights I also have direct knowledge. The laws are fine, but there is a lack of law and order. It's easy to lose your property -- I'm talking about your business interests. This is a huge impediment to investment, both foreign and domestic.
Agree with you about China, which is a juggernaut. The Chinese economy has its own problems, but so does the U.S.
Social contract, passive adaptation, and aggressive immobility. I had not put as much thought to these, but I can understand the arguments for them.
It’s going to be fascinating to watch what happens ver the next few years. Russia has such a different culture than my own, that I simply cannot guess what will happen. Thank you for writing things in a way that is so informative! I wish more people read what you say.
Not much has resonated with me from this essay, despite the author's effort to theorize the situation. Very hard thing to do when you talk about a country of almost 150 million, stretching 11 time zones, and with soo many ethnicities - to remember that Russians are the great majority, over 75% and in majority in most of those republics (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republics_of_Russia#Republics).
All these theories try ultimately tp box all this diversity. One little thing seemed right, the notion that Russians prize their individualism and choices, whatever they might be. That also has an universalist tint to it.
Also, the author misses the point that all states are authoritarian, in the sense that the executive has the authority to do things. Is Russia more authoritarian than, let's say Germany or UK nowadays? It really doesn't look like that to an outside observer.
https://www.racket.news/p/the-library-timeline-of-foreign-censorship
So the question is, why don't these other peoples not revolt? One would need to apply the same methodology and check for ansers. However, the biggest missing ingredient is not discussed at all. The fact that the majority revolts when there is shortage of food (See the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution; the English Revolution and the American Revolution were from the start full fledged and confined burgoise revolutions, going against "feudal" taxes). Otherwise they stay away from trouble. Was the Maidan action representative for the whole Ukraine?! Heck no! If it were, it wouldn't have ended with a protracted civil war and a foreign intervention. In fact it was a protest that served as a cover for a coup d'etat...
Also, there is so far scant evidence of North Korean troops doing anything in Kursk area, like in ppm level, why even mention it. ANd after the USAID was gutted, is Meduza still functioning?
Generally all revolutions are conflicts between rivaling groups of elites. Also the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution 1917. The latter, like the US civil War, a conflict between the old agricultural elites and the up and coming captains of the industry.
There some fodder for your Ukraine thesis (dated November 2013 / Google translates it well):
https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=204&page=2
Nah, there were lots of factions each pulling in certain direction. In France, the burgeoise won against a more redistributive approach. In Russia the Bolsheviks won after they fooled everyone (urban soviets, military soviets, peasantry looking for land redistribution)...
Even in England there were levelers and diggers...
In the Iran revolution there were factions, including communists. In Ukraine it was the right wing that did the shooting and killing on Maidan and cerried with the coup and threatened Rada if they don't accept the overturn of the government and paper it over.
Fascinating. I like it when you indulge in this kind of discussion.
It's interesting to hear your account of the three different schools. I must say, I always thought of the social contract as working in a slightly different way, where instead of providing stability and prosperity, the government's commitment was basically to stay out of people's personal lives. People gave up their political freedom to Putin, but in exchange, they maintained their personal freedom.
To some extent, that would bridge the gap between the authoritarian social contract and the aggressive immobility, in that the breach of the contract would be an infringement on people's ability to get by without interference from the government.
In that case, I think the most likely trigger for protests in Russia would be a general mobilization for the war because that is pretty much the ultimate infringement on people's personal freedom.