This is an excellent, insightful essay, which to my mind paints a better picture of Russian society's complex relationship to the Russian state, than anything I've read lately. I find the concept of "aggressive immobility" to be pretty persuasive, although I would say also that even if this is entirely true (and I think it may be), it does not contradict the idea that elements of the other theories may also be true.
Just one quibble: "The Kremlin’s abortive attempt to mobilize men into service in the autumn of 2022, and its consistent unwillingness to repeat the experiment, would seem to reinforce the notion that Russians value their autonomy as the key resource with which to solve the problems the state throws at them."
Where do you get the idea that the activation of reserves (to be technically precise about what the Russian military did in the autumn of 2022) was "abortive"? After a shambolic start, it did achieve its objective of increasing available force by 300,000. I don't think you call anything "abortive", which achieved its stated goal.
Why was it not repeated? Because new brigades require salaries, equipment, munitions, and supplies, and take that many people out of a work force already serious challenged by labor shortages, and the achieved force level, reinforced by a healthy flow of volunteers, appears to have been deemed enough. Once it became apparent that the initial plan to seize the country in a couple of weeks was a failure, the Russians pivoted to a long war scenario with economic and military planning going hand in hand, in a very Soviet way, a la WWII. For that, they needed to get the balance right between military expenditure and the resilience of the economy. That's not just a question of civilian morale (although that's also a factor), it's a question of designing and planning the entire chain of the generation of force all the way back to the basic economics of the country -- in a very Soviet, central-planning manner.
RUSI wrote about the Russians' "AK-47 economy" last summer -- crude, inefficient, but hella robust. Good for winning wars -- like Stalin's economy was after the five year plans of crash industrialization. I'm afraid though that Russia will fall further and further behind economically after the war is over and the dust settles -- as Stalin's USSR did after WWII.
I don't think you're right about the reasons why mobilization has not been repeated. Russia has continued to recruit new soldiers who also need equipment, munitions, and supplies, but they have done so at much higher salaries because they have opted to recruit volunteers in exchange for huge bonuses.
Social contract, passive adaptation, and aggressive immobility. I had not put as much thought to these, but I can understand the arguments for them.
It’s going to be fascinating to watch what happens ver the next few years. Russia has such a different culture than my own, that I simply cannot guess what will happen. Thank you for writing things in a way that is so informative! I wish more people read what you say.
Fascinating. I like it when you indulge in this kind of discussion.
It's interesting to hear your account of the three different schools. I must say, I always thought of the social contract as working in a slightly different way, where instead of providing stability and prosperity, the government's commitment was basically to stay out of people's personal lives. People gave up their political freedom to Putin, but in exchange, they maintained their personal freedom.
To some extent, that would bridge the gap between the authoritarian social contract and the aggressive immobility, in that the breach of the contract would be an infringement on people's ability to get by without interference from the government.
In that case, I think the most likely trigger for protests in Russia would be a general mobilization for the war because that is pretty much the ultimate infringement on people's personal freedom.
This is an excellent, insightful essay, which to my mind paints a better picture of Russian society's complex relationship to the Russian state, than anything I've read lately. I find the concept of "aggressive immobility" to be pretty persuasive, although I would say also that even if this is entirely true (and I think it may be), it does not contradict the idea that elements of the other theories may also be true.
Just one quibble: "The Kremlin’s abortive attempt to mobilize men into service in the autumn of 2022, and its consistent unwillingness to repeat the experiment, would seem to reinforce the notion that Russians value their autonomy as the key resource with which to solve the problems the state throws at them."
Where do you get the idea that the activation of reserves (to be technically precise about what the Russian military did in the autumn of 2022) was "abortive"? After a shambolic start, it did achieve its objective of increasing available force by 300,000. I don't think you call anything "abortive", which achieved its stated goal.
Why was it not repeated? Because new brigades require salaries, equipment, munitions, and supplies, and take that many people out of a work force already serious challenged by labor shortages, and the achieved force level, reinforced by a healthy flow of volunteers, appears to have been deemed enough. Once it became apparent that the initial plan to seize the country in a couple of weeks was a failure, the Russians pivoted to a long war scenario with economic and military planning going hand in hand, in a very Soviet way, a la WWII. For that, they needed to get the balance right between military expenditure and the resilience of the economy. That's not just a question of civilian morale (although that's also a factor), it's a question of designing and planning the entire chain of the generation of force all the way back to the basic economics of the country -- in a very Soviet, central-planning manner.
RUSI wrote about the Russians' "AK-47 economy" last summer -- crude, inefficient, but hella robust. Good for winning wars -- like Stalin's economy was after the five year plans of crash industrialization. I'm afraid though that Russia will fall further and further behind economically after the war is over and the dust settles -- as Stalin's USSR did after WWII.
I don't think you're right about the reasons why mobilization has not been repeated. Russia has continued to recruit new soldiers who also need equipment, munitions, and supplies, but they have done so at much higher salaries because they have opted to recruit volunteers in exchange for huge bonuses.
Social contract, passive adaptation, and aggressive immobility. I had not put as much thought to these, but I can understand the arguments for them.
It’s going to be fascinating to watch what happens ver the next few years. Russia has such a different culture than my own, that I simply cannot guess what will happen. Thank you for writing things in a way that is so informative! I wish more people read what you say.
Fascinating. I like it when you indulge in this kind of discussion.
It's interesting to hear your account of the three different schools. I must say, I always thought of the social contract as working in a slightly different way, where instead of providing stability and prosperity, the government's commitment was basically to stay out of people's personal lives. People gave up their political freedom to Putin, but in exchange, they maintained their personal freedom.
To some extent, that would bridge the gap between the authoritarian social contract and the aggressive immobility, in that the breach of the contract would be an infringement on people's ability to get by without interference from the government.
In that case, I think the most likely trigger for protests in Russia would be a general mobilization for the war because that is pretty much the ultimate infringement on people's personal freedom.