Thanks for the links to other opinions and for an especially excellent music selection. My comment is - in some ways - a reply to Richard, whose points are valid: I agree that Ukraine has demonstrated exceptional resolve and innovation in its defense and that Ukraine is unlikely to accept a ceasefire that doesn't protect many of its vital interests. However, I read Sam's essay as very useful in its brief statement of what a maximalist (probably unachievable) and a minimalist "victory" for Russia would entail. The focus of this essay then turns to what even a minimalist Russian victory would likely mean for Europe, as expressed in these paragraphs:
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"This, then, complicates the definition of victory and defeat. A ceasefire only equates to a Russian victory if it leaves Russia with the freedom to act. It is likely not within Ukraine’s own power, however, to determine whether Russia has that freedom. Given the contours of politics in Washington, that task will fall to Europe. A Russian victory, then, is not only one that exhausts Ukraine’s willingness and ability to fight: it’s one that outmatches Europe’s willingness and ability to bolster Ukraine after the fighting stops.
A Russian victory, then, would mean three things for Europe: the inability autonomously to deter further Russian aggression, the ceding to Russia of a veto to Moscow over the expansion of the European project, and the extension of insecurity to levels that will strain the ability of the EU to cope. "
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Sam's discussion of these three likely outcomes is entirely credible given the confused and - over the last year - weakened (both material but more importantly political) support Europe has provided. Sam's conclusion vis a vis how even a minimalist win will affect Europe suggests that Europe itself will be substantially weakened:
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"The result of these pressures—together with the need to provide deterrence against Russian aggression against EU member states themselves—will likely be to exacerbate tensions within the EU over fiscal policy, borders and the rule of law. Nervous populations will, as they have to date, likely turn towards national governments and away from multilateralism."
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I'm reminded of the verse sometimes attributed to Benjamin Franklin:
“For the want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For the want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For the want of a horse the rider was lost,
For the want of a rider the battle was lost,
For the want of a battle the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horseshoe-nail.”
For want of an effective strategy and fulsome resolve from 'the West', not only may Ukraine's destruction continue, but Europe may become so weakened and divided that illiberal democracy and/or autocratic states will become the norm. And if Europe 'falls'?
A line from "A Man for All Seasons" comes to mind, which I incorporate here to answer that question: Can America "stand upright in the winds that would blow then?"
I'm sorry to say that all of this is a complete waste of words and another attempt to deny Ukraine any agency. Western commentators have constantly underestimated the country and its people. It is ridiculous to talk of a Russian 'victory' when its military is suffering grievous losses in men and equipment to capture fields and small settlements. It lost 400,000 men to take territory the size of Cheshire last year. After months of trying Russia is no nearer to regaining its lost territory in Kursk or capturing all of Donbas.. It has been comprehensively defeated in the Black Sea, and largely in the air. Ukraine is developing its own long range missiles and produced over a million drones last year. Putin has suffered a defeat in Syria and with its gas exports. Ukraine will not just give up next year as so many commentators seem to predict. I work with Ukrainians and I know this to be a fact.
I agree with you in part but also read Sam's column as more of a thought exercise than a prediction. All of it makes me shudder, especially in light of the lightweight responses of many European countries (hello, Germany) to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Despite being rattled by much of Sam's column, I feel like it's still preferable to think ahead/anticipate/brainstorm and be prepared than it is to be complacent and hope for the best. The West wasn't prepared for the invasion and is *still* slow to respond in some areas.
Thanks for the links to other opinions and for an especially excellent music selection. My comment is - in some ways - a reply to Richard, whose points are valid: I agree that Ukraine has demonstrated exceptional resolve and innovation in its defense and that Ukraine is unlikely to accept a ceasefire that doesn't protect many of its vital interests. However, I read Sam's essay as very useful in its brief statement of what a maximalist (probably unachievable) and a minimalist "victory" for Russia would entail. The focus of this essay then turns to what even a minimalist Russian victory would likely mean for Europe, as expressed in these paragraphs:
==============
"This, then, complicates the definition of victory and defeat. A ceasefire only equates to a Russian victory if it leaves Russia with the freedom to act. It is likely not within Ukraine’s own power, however, to determine whether Russia has that freedom. Given the contours of politics in Washington, that task will fall to Europe. A Russian victory, then, is not only one that exhausts Ukraine’s willingness and ability to fight: it’s one that outmatches Europe’s willingness and ability to bolster Ukraine after the fighting stops.
A Russian victory, then, would mean three things for Europe: the inability autonomously to deter further Russian aggression, the ceding to Russia of a veto to Moscow over the expansion of the European project, and the extension of insecurity to levels that will strain the ability of the EU to cope. "
===============
Sam's discussion of these three likely outcomes is entirely credible given the confused and - over the last year - weakened (both material but more importantly political) support Europe has provided. Sam's conclusion vis a vis how even a minimalist win will affect Europe suggests that Europe itself will be substantially weakened:
=============
"The result of these pressures—together with the need to provide deterrence against Russian aggression against EU member states themselves—will likely be to exacerbate tensions within the EU over fiscal policy, borders and the rule of law. Nervous populations will, as they have to date, likely turn towards national governments and away from multilateralism."
============
I'm reminded of the verse sometimes attributed to Benjamin Franklin:
“For the want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For the want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For the want of a horse the rider was lost,
For the want of a rider the battle was lost,
For the want of a battle the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horseshoe-nail.”
For want of an effective strategy and fulsome resolve from 'the West', not only may Ukraine's destruction continue, but Europe may become so weakened and divided that illiberal democracy and/or autocratic states will become the norm. And if Europe 'falls'?
A line from "A Man for All Seasons" comes to mind, which I incorporate here to answer that question: Can America "stand upright in the winds that would blow then?"
I'm sorry to say that all of this is a complete waste of words and another attempt to deny Ukraine any agency. Western commentators have constantly underestimated the country and its people. It is ridiculous to talk of a Russian 'victory' when its military is suffering grievous losses in men and equipment to capture fields and small settlements. It lost 400,000 men to take territory the size of Cheshire last year. After months of trying Russia is no nearer to regaining its lost territory in Kursk or capturing all of Donbas.. It has been comprehensively defeated in the Black Sea, and largely in the air. Ukraine is developing its own long range missiles and produced over a million drones last year. Putin has suffered a defeat in Syria and with its gas exports. Ukraine will not just give up next year as so many commentators seem to predict. I work with Ukrainians and I know this to be a fact.
I agree with you in part but also read Sam's column as more of a thought exercise than a prediction. All of it makes me shudder, especially in light of the lightweight responses of many European countries (hello, Germany) to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Despite being rattled by much of Sam's column, I feel like it's still preferable to think ahead/anticipate/brainstorm and be prepared than it is to be complacent and hope for the best. The West wasn't prepared for the invasion and is *still* slow to respond in some areas.