The problem with a compromise that favors Russia is primarily of realpolitik, not legitimacy. What we have here is somebody invading a sovereign _western_ country, for the first time in over half a century. It's a matter of survival for the west that it ends as badly as possible for the invader, otherwise nobody is safe anymore.
As to Prof Posen, this article - published 18 years ago - shows why he's totally out to lunch: https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics Putin has been following this path since at least 2007, i.e. ""A repudiation of the empire-building function," Dugin warns sternly, "would signify the end of the Russian people as a historical reality, as a civilizational phenomenon. Such a repudiation would be tantamount to national suicide" (197). Deprived of an empire, Russians will "disappear as a nation" (251). The sole viable course, in Dugin's view, is for Russians to rebound from the debacle of 1989- 1991 by recreating a great "supra-national empire," one in which ethnic Russians would occupy "a privileged position" (251-252). The result of such a rebuilding effort would be "a giant continental state in the administration of which they [Russians] will play the central role" (253). This ethnic model, Dugin notes, is quite similar to that of the former Soviet Union.
In order to facilitate the recreation of a vast Russian-dominated continental empire, Dugin advocates the unleashing of Russian nationalist sentiment, but of a specific type. "This [Russian] nationalism," he writes, "should not employ state but, rather, cultural-ethnic terminology, with a special emphasis on such categories as 'Narodnost" and 'Russian Orthodoxy'" (255). Religious sentiment, Dugin urges, should be placed front and center: "Russians should realize that they are Orthodox in the first place; [ethnic] Russians in the second place; and only in the third place, people" (255). There is a need, Dugin insists, for the "total churchification" of Russians, for the Russian nation to become viewed simply as "the Church" (255-256). Such an emphasis, he believes, should--together with a persistent focus on the glorious past and bright future of the Russian nation--help bring about the "demographic upsurge" so desperately needed by Russians today. Economic incentives by themselves will prove insufficient to promote such an upsurge (256-257). One "radical" slogan, Dugin concludes, must be consistently put forward: "The nation is everything; the individual is nothing" (257). This slogan encapsulates one of Dugin's most cherished beliefs. ...
One way in which Russia will be able to turn other states against Atlanticism will be an astute use of the country's raw material riches. "In the beginning stage [of the struggle against Atlanticism]," Dugin writes, "Russia can offer its potential partners in the East and West its resources as compensation for exacerbating their relations with the U.S." (276). To induce the Anaconda to release its grip on the coastline of Eurasia, it must be attacked relentlessly on its home territory, within its own hemisphere, and throughout Eurasia. "All levels of geopolitical pressure," Dugin insists, "must be activated simultaneously" ...
With regard to the Balkans, Dugin assigns "the north of the Balkan peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria" to what he terms the "Russian South" (343). "Serbia is Russia," a subheading in the book declares unambiguously (462). In Dugin's opinion, all of the states of the "Orthodox collectivist East" with time will seek to establish binding ties to "Moscow the Third Rome," thus rejecting the snares of the "rational-individualistic West" (389, 393). The states of Romania, Macedonia, "Serbian Bosnia," and even NATO-member Greece in time, Dugin predicts, will become constituent parts of the Eurasian- Russian Empire (346, 383).
As for the former union republics of the USSR situated within Europe, they all, in Dugin's view, (with the exception of Estonia) should be absorbed by Eurasia-Russia. "Belorussia," Dugin asserts flatly, "should be seen as a part of Russia" (377). In similar fashion, Moldova is seen as a part of what Dugin calls "the Russian South" (343).
On the key question of Ukraine, Dugin underlines: "Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has no particular cultural import or universal significance, no geographic uniqueness, no ethnic exclusiveness" (377). "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions," he warns, "represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics" (348). And he adds that, "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'" (379). However, as we have seen, for Dugin all such "sanitary cordons" are inadmissible." Ibid.
And so forth and so on. Ceding another chunk of Ukraine to Putin - besides Crimea which was bit off in 2014 - just advances Putin's interests, it would not stop his intent.
For me, this is a really clear and concise summary of a number of things. First, why “the West” shouldn’t try to dictate the end game to Ukraine; secondly, why Russian people are behaving so timidly (given that they can’t all be paranoid schizophrenics) and, third, as an exercise in concise writing!
As always, you give us a lot to think about and look up. Thank you. Is there a way to send these political prisoners letters from abroad? I saw a tweet before Christmas about how to send them to American prisoners there, but I'm wondering whether it's possible to do the same to these you mention.
The problem with a compromise that favors Russia is primarily of realpolitik, not legitimacy. What we have here is somebody invading a sovereign _western_ country, for the first time in over half a century. It's a matter of survival for the west that it ends as badly as possible for the invader, otherwise nobody is safe anymore.
*yes, "western" in the cultural sense.
As to Prof Posen, this article - published 18 years ago - shows why he's totally out to lunch: https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics Putin has been following this path since at least 2007, i.e. ""A repudiation of the empire-building function," Dugin warns sternly, "would signify the end of the Russian people as a historical reality, as a civilizational phenomenon. Such a repudiation would be tantamount to national suicide" (197). Deprived of an empire, Russians will "disappear as a nation" (251). The sole viable course, in Dugin's view, is for Russians to rebound from the debacle of 1989- 1991 by recreating a great "supra-national empire," one in which ethnic Russians would occupy "a privileged position" (251-252). The result of such a rebuilding effort would be "a giant continental state in the administration of which they [Russians] will play the central role" (253). This ethnic model, Dugin notes, is quite similar to that of the former Soviet Union.
In order to facilitate the recreation of a vast Russian-dominated continental empire, Dugin advocates the unleashing of Russian nationalist sentiment, but of a specific type. "This [Russian] nationalism," he writes, "should not employ state but, rather, cultural-ethnic terminology, with a special emphasis on such categories as 'Narodnost" and 'Russian Orthodoxy'" (255). Religious sentiment, Dugin urges, should be placed front and center: "Russians should realize that they are Orthodox in the first place; [ethnic] Russians in the second place; and only in the third place, people" (255). There is a need, Dugin insists, for the "total churchification" of Russians, for the Russian nation to become viewed simply as "the Church" (255-256). Such an emphasis, he believes, should--together with a persistent focus on the glorious past and bright future of the Russian nation--help bring about the "demographic upsurge" so desperately needed by Russians today. Economic incentives by themselves will prove insufficient to promote such an upsurge (256-257). One "radical" slogan, Dugin concludes, must be consistently put forward: "The nation is everything; the individual is nothing" (257). This slogan encapsulates one of Dugin's most cherished beliefs. ...
One way in which Russia will be able to turn other states against Atlanticism will be an astute use of the country's raw material riches. "In the beginning stage [of the struggle against Atlanticism]," Dugin writes, "Russia can offer its potential partners in the East and West its resources as compensation for exacerbating their relations with the U.S." (276). To induce the Anaconda to release its grip on the coastline of Eurasia, it must be attacked relentlessly on its home territory, within its own hemisphere, and throughout Eurasia. "All levels of geopolitical pressure," Dugin insists, "must be activated simultaneously" ...
With regard to the Balkans, Dugin assigns "the north of the Balkan peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria" to what he terms the "Russian South" (343). "Serbia is Russia," a subheading in the book declares unambiguously (462). In Dugin's opinion, all of the states of the "Orthodox collectivist East" with time will seek to establish binding ties to "Moscow the Third Rome," thus rejecting the snares of the "rational-individualistic West" (389, 393). The states of Romania, Macedonia, "Serbian Bosnia," and even NATO-member Greece in time, Dugin predicts, will become constituent parts of the Eurasian- Russian Empire (346, 383).
As for the former union republics of the USSR situated within Europe, they all, in Dugin's view, (with the exception of Estonia) should be absorbed by Eurasia-Russia. "Belorussia," Dugin asserts flatly, "should be seen as a part of Russia" (377). In similar fashion, Moldova is seen as a part of what Dugin calls "the Russian South" (343).
On the key question of Ukraine, Dugin underlines: "Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has no particular cultural import or universal significance, no geographic uniqueness, no ethnic exclusiveness" (377). "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions," he warns, "represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics" (348). And he adds that, "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'" (379). However, as we have seen, for Dugin all such "sanitary cordons" are inadmissible." Ibid.
And so forth and so on. Ceding another chunk of Ukraine to Putin - besides Crimea which was bit off in 2014 - just advances Putin's interests, it would not stop his intent.
Thank you.
For me, this is a really clear and concise summary of a number of things. First, why “the West” shouldn’t try to dictate the end game to Ukraine; secondly, why Russian people are behaving so timidly (given that they can’t all be paranoid schizophrenics) and, third, as an exercise in concise writing!
Not sure about your taste in music though!
Giving land to Putin only invites Putin to want to take more. It is unblievable that some experts do not understand this.
As always, you give us a lot to think about and look up. Thank you. Is there a way to send these political prisoners letters from abroad? I saw a tweet before Christmas about how to send them to American prisoners there, but I'm wondering whether it's possible to do the same to these you mention.